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Crafting Digital Transparency: 




According to the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, transparency should be 
considered by design in data processing activities. Transparency entails the promise of 
control and legitimacy: if we can see inside algorithmic systems, we can ensure compliance 
with legal rights and principles. But is “by design” able to ensure compliance? I interrogate 
the relationship of law and technology by asking how law can capture the products and 
intricacies of design processes. Combining socio-legal and science and technology studies, 
I argue that “transparency by design” does not exert meaningful control. I assert that design 
should be understood not only as production of algorithms but as human-driven contextual 
social processes, in which values are prioritized and negotiated, ignored and assumed, and 
at times fought over and compromised. Design processes often lack transparency and 
democratic participation, leading to legitimacy gaps. Yet transparency of design is not at the 
core of data protection. Despite the limitations of transparency, transparent design would 
make these social practices explicit and reintroduce participation. Furthermore, it re-
politicizes technological design by creating space for value prioritization and 
operationalization. The shift to design facilitates a discursive turn to procedural language 
of access to justice. If we prioritize access alongside transparency as a guiding design 
constraint, the humans involved in design processes and interacting with algorithmic 
systems become visible, giving us new tools, e.g., measurable accessibility and usability, for 
legally informed technological design.  
I. The Promise of Transparency by Design 
Transparency incorporates the architectural metaphor of looking inside. Metaphors are 
persuasive instruments that shape reality; hence, they matter. We attribute to transparency 
the promise of power and control over architecture. These architectures might be physical 
and tangible, like the glass wall, or immaterial and abstract, like those of algorithmic systems. 
The metaphor of seeing inside is connected with shifting configurations of power and 
control, which are entwined with the societal processes of digitalization. Through 
transparency, we can see with our own eyes how we are controlled, and we can exert control 
in return. Still, our control is limited metaphorically: it promises us a view of the inside from 
the outside, but can we get in? Could an alternative architectural metaphor be found to take 
us over the threshold, to grant us access to the inside, rather than only letting us gaze in?  
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Humans are increasingly governed through algorithmic systems in their everyday 
activities, both in private and public spheres. Public administrations are automating their 
decision-making processes, from taxation and social security to immigration and border 
control. These developments enable algorithmic governance, a distinct form of social 
ordering that emerges from the increasing use of relatively autonomous software.1 At the 
core of these new forms of governance are the statistical inferences produced through 
automated, encoded procedures that transform input data into a desired output.2 
Within law, automated decision-making has become a central conceptualization of 
the regulatory challenge. The conceptualization derives its institutional basis from General 
Data Protection Regulation (679/2016, GDPR), which introduced a data subject’s right not 
to be subjected to automated individual decisions. Yet this essay hopes to detach from this 
perspective. Instead, I discuss what precedes the use of algorithmic tools, namely the 
different dimensions of technological design that give shape to this use. The focus is on the 
relationships between law, technological design, and human behavior within material and 
immaterial architectures.  
Technological design may exacerbate existing discriminatory structures or introduce 
new forms of injustice which existing legal frameworks struggle to capture.3 Research on 
algorithmic discrimination demonstrates how societal biases become embedded in training 
datasets as well as in the architectural choices.4 Yet discrimination is not limited to 
technological architectures, and discriminatory structural practices often remain implicit in 
society despite continuous policy and legal action.5 Still, the ethical anxiety over algorithmic 
bias has contributed to the formulation of a plethora of ethical guidelines for AI that 
advocate transparency as a panacea.6 The GDPR obligates organizations to implement 
transparency by design and by default. But does transparency by design prevent the 
unwanted consequences of bad algorithmic design? And does its feasibility depend on what 
is made transparent? Ultimately, how can law capture technological design?  
In this essay, I have adopted a socio-legal procedural perspective to technological 
design. The approach is complemented by science and technology studies (STS) that 
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2 Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in Media Technologies: Essays on Communication, 
Materiality, and Society 167 (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., 2014). 
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Tuomas Ojanen eds., 2020).  
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demonstrate the intricate ways in which technological design embeds human values and 
ideologies either inadvertently or by choice. As transparency is connected with the promise 
of rendering the abstract tangible and therefore controllable, transparency by design is in 
danger of materializing design into its products. While the approach may alleviate the 
notorious AI black box problem and introduce monitoring mechanisms, it simultaneously 
obscures the humans involved in design processes. Transparency by design may reinforce 
the notion that regulatory action should focus on the products and not the processes of 
design. I argue that instead of algorithmic systems, we should concentrate on the social 
processes in which value-laden design choices are made.  
When we shift the focus to processes, a reading that the EU’s data protection 
framework seems to enable, we gain two additional perspectives. First, we can examine 
technological architectures in terms of procedural concepts, tools, and frameworks and 
hence enrichen the debate on algorithmic governance with the vocabulary of access to 
justice. Second, the procedural framing draws attention to the social processes of design, 
struggling against the materialization entailed in transparency. The processes make visible 
the humans involved in and affected by different design choices and frame design processes 
as social interactions between individuals and groups of people, emphasizing questions of 
representation, participation, and access. These values are also at the core of democratic 
legitimacy and legislative processes, another example of the design of abstract 
architectures.7  
I have built my argument in three steps. First, I discuss the concept of design to 
demonstrate how design is not about technological artifacts but rather about social 
processes in which compromises are negotiated and conflicts managed between those 
involved. The aim of this analysis is to contextualize what is meant by transparency by 
design and to emphasize the similarities between legal and technological architectures. Next, 
in section III, I examine the object of transparency by design in the GDPR. Although the 
GDPR’s transparency obligations explicitly refer to data processing activities and not 
algorithmic systems, the framework cannot escape the implicit assumption of technological 
artifacts embedded in the logic and means of transparency. In section IV, I elaborate the 
procedural perspective on algorithmic systems and return to the architectural similarities 
between law and technology as products of value-sensitive design. Despite the limitations 
of proceduralization, this framing brings to light the humans that determine who are the 
perceived users of algorithmic systems. Furthermore, the focus on design processes enables 
us to adopt alternative design principles alongside transparency—for example, accessibility 
and usability—that just might get us to the inside of technological architectures.  
 
7 Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 Daedalus 121 (1980). 
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II. Designing Technology and Law: 
Architectural Similarities of Abstract Structures 
A. Technological Design Is Not Value-Neutral 
What is design? According to the Cambridge Dictionary, design refers to the creation or 
production of something for a specific purpose, a thing fabricated according to a plan to 
serve a given function or solve a given problem. Design is a process of human creation 
dating back thousands of years.  
One of the most famous design theorists of the twentieth century, architect and 
urban designer Christopher Alexander, explored the recipes for designing well-constructed 
spaces. In his 1979 book, The Timeless Way of Building, Alexander introduced the concept of 
“quality without a name,” to describe good design solutions one can instantly recognize as 
such through feelings of contentment and delight but which remain difficult to explain.8 
Alexander sought to collect reusable design solutions that would result in desired social 
interaction within urban landscapes, making the connection between architecture and social 
interaction explicit.  
Alexander’s 1970s concept of design patterns, repeatable design solutions for 
certain reoccurring problems, was later adopted by the software engineering community, 
which translated the concept from tangible, physical architecture to immaterial and abstract 
software structures.9 The translocation of design patterns from urban planning to software 
design emphasizes the obvious connection between design activities and technological 
architectures as the product of such processes. Although architectural design relates to 
something concrete and physical, abstract structures such as law and interconnected digital 
networks should also be understood as the result of design choices. However, the 
abstractness and immateriality of such structures can be questioned, as they too are 
connected with the physical world in which they have impact, and there is no clear 
distinction between the social and the material.  
Hence, technological systems, like other forms of architecture, are always designed 
and their form does not emerge spontaneously. This is why it makes sense to talk about the 
subjectivity of humans within technological design. Because of the very nature of human-
driven design, technological solutions can never be neutral, although they can be subjective 
either inadvertently or by choice. It was established early on that technological design 
incorporates values and ideologies of the designers and others involved in the design 
 
8 Christopher Alexander, The Timeless Way of Building (1979). 
9 See generally Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., No Silver Bullet: Essence and Accident of Software Engineering, 20 
Computer 10 (1987); see also Erich Gamma et al., Design Pattern: Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented 
Software (1994). 
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process.10 Also, STS highlights values and social practices which shape technologies.11 As 
early STS scholar Langdon Winner argued in the 1980s, the political cannot be separated 
from technology.12 Winner contextualizes his groundbreaking analysis in between two 
earlier traditions of social studies that focused on technological change: the deterministic 
and the social constructivist accounts of technology. The deterministic accounts 
emphasized the inherent qualities of artifacts that are decisive in shaping the consequences 
of their use. In turn, the constructivist approaches aimed to describe how social 
environments and stratification of society define such consequences. According to Winner, 
his theory of technological politics complements the latter perspective of social shaping of 
technology, which erroneously reduces politics of artifacts to social circumstances.  
In his seminal article, Winner distinguished two ways that artifacts gain political 
properties. The first includes artifacts designed or deployed to settle an issue, particularly 
human community. He drew his example from urban planning in New York City, where 
the city’s infamous “master builder” Robert Moses used design to enforce his social and 
racial prejudices by building bridges too low for public buses to pass under, effectively 
prohibiting certain low-income groups and social minorities from access to certain areas of 
the city. The example of Moses’s low bridges has become a much-referenced anecdote in 
social science studies on technology, gaining momentum as well as critique through its 
narrative appeal.13 Despite the fact that the story has taken various incarnations, changing 
in form to suit the argument at hand better, it does reflect the very physical obstacles to 
social interaction that fabricated architectures may have.  
According to Winner, the political nature of such artifacts is dependent first and 
foremost on the decision to deploy (or not deploy) the technology in question and 
subsequently on the “seemingly innocuous design features [that] actually mask social 
choices of profound significance.”14 These artifacts can acquire political properties 
depending on the context and design choices. Winner differentiates these from the more 
rigid, inherently political technologies, devices, and systems that are usually connected to 
certain configurations of power and authority in society. For example, the atom bomb with 
its destructive capabilities needs a centralized and hierarchical chain of command, calling 
for authoritarian and rigid social configurations. Inherently political technologies do not 
 
10 Lewis Mumford, Authoritarian and Democratic Technics, 5 Tech. & Culture 1 (1964); Kenneth C. Laudon, 
Computers and Bureaucratic Reform: The Political Functions of Urban Information Systems (1974); Winner, 
supra note 7; Helen Nissenbaum, Values in Technical Design, in 1 Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and 
Ethics lxvi (Carl Mitcham ed., 2005); Taina Bucher, If . . . Then: Algorithmic Power and Politics (2018).  
11 Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (1987); Sheila 
Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-Production, in States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social 
Order 1 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004); Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology and STS, 138 Thesis 
Eleven 3 (2017). 
12 Winner, supra note 7. 
13 Bernward Joerges, Do Politics Have Artefacts?, 29 Soc. Stud. Sci. 411 (1999). 
14 Winner, supra note 7, at 128. 
86 Critical Analysis of Law 8:1 (2021) 
 
grant leeway for their seemingly unimportant design choices but instead the decision to 
develop and deploy these systems already encompasses an inescapable choice for certain 
formations of social life, as “there are no alternative physical designs or arrangements that 
would make a significant difference; there are, furthermore, no genuine possibilities for 
creative intervention by different social systems—capitalist or socialist—that could change 
the intractability of the entity or significantly alter the quality of its political effects.”15  
B. Implementing Values into Design Is Difficult 
Winner’s examination of the inescapable political dimension of technological design 
also seems to hold true in relation to more abstract and immaterial technological 
architectures. Interconnected and data-driven algorithmic systems are also design products 
that incorporate political choices.  
Of Winner’s two categories—the potentially political but more flexible versus the 
inherently political and more rigid technologies—either one can be used to describe 
algorithmic systems being deployed in legal decision-making processes. One can argue that 
legal institutions reinforce their own authority and control in society through the choices 
made regarding technological development. Hence, such algorithmic systems cannot escape 
the centralized and partly authoritarian quality of these institutions. However, the 
counterargument to this can be found in the legal principles, rules, and mechanisms that 
aim to govern and prevent the abuse of public power, and the varying degrees of success 
when applied to this end. From the socio-legal perspective, it becomes evident that 
principles such as due process, rule of law, and transparency should inform the design of 
algorithmic systems. In the context of legal decision-making, these values should be made 
explicit and defined by formal legal structures, and then operationalized within 
technological design. 
But how can we ensure that the right values are taken into consideration in design 
processes? Helen Nissenbaum’s examination of value-sensitive design elaborates the 
diverse practical challenges associated with applying design methods to implement values 
into engineering products, processes, and systems.16 She distinguishes between instrumental 
and substantive values; the latter is of particular interest to our context of implementing 
legal principles into algorithmic systems:  
For those committed to bringing selected values to bear in technical design, the ideal result 
is a world of artifacts that embody not only such instrumental values as efficiency, safety, 
reliability, and ease of use, but promote (or at least do not undermine) substantive values 
to which the surrounding societies or cultures subscribe. In liberal democracies such values 
may include, among others, liberty, justice, privacy, security, friendship, comfort, trust, 
autonomy, and transparency.17 
 
15 Id. at 134.  
16 Nissenbaum, supra note 10. 
17 Id. at lxvi. 
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According to Nissenbaum, epistemological challenges arise in design processes 
because the implementation of values requires their operationalization into design 
constraints through collaboration between different knowledge domains. While designers 
are focused on particular design specifications, the philosophical reflection on the origins 
and interpretations of values is often overlooked. Furthermore, values are contextual and 
vary across groups and cultures, and so different interpretations of how they are best 
preserved may lead to different design choices. Additional epistemological challenges arise 
within empirical inquiry, which is necessary for determining if the final design has succeeded 
in embodying the values as intended. Nissenbaum emphasizes the political and socio-legal 
dimension of values, through which normative theory can facilitate balancing and justifying 
trade-offs when different values conflict.18 Practical challenges ensue from the sparseness 
of design methodologies for software engineering, which impede discovery of relevant 
values, translation between fields required for their operationalization, resolution of 
conflicts, and the verification of successful implementation.19  
These insights demonstrate how the design of algorithmic systems is a human-
driven social process that encapsulates complex social interactions. In social practices that 
constitute design, design choices are negotiated, functionalities are prioritized within 
budgetary limits, and differences of opinions are solved through compromises. These 
choices can seem trivial, much as Winner argued, and be concerned with minor issues such 
as the placement of icons on websites. An example of such a seemingly innocuous design 
choice with severe legal effects can be found in a condemnatory decision given at the 
highest level of judicial review in Finland, by the Chancellor of Justice.20 The case concerned 
a web service deployed by an employment authority for unemployed job seekers entitled to 
social security benefits. The service had been optimized and tested only for laptop users 
and important content could not be accessed on mobile devices, which were primarily used 
amongst job seekers. Thus, mobile users failed to fill in required content, leading to punitive 
debt recovery. Invoking Finland’s constitutional principle of good administration, the 
Chancellor of Justice emphasized the authority’s responsibility to include the end-user 
perspective in technological design. The authority should have considered their end-users’ 
tendency to use mobile devices during the design and deployment. 
To summarize, the concept of technological design transcends the production of 
the technological artifacts. Ultimately, it draws our attention to the social processes that 
shape design choices and the social consequences that follow the development and 
deployment of technological systems. Through social framing, the inherently political 
nature of design becomes visible and inescapable.  
 
18 Id. at lxviii. 
19 Id. at lxix. 
20 OKV/2019/1/2017 (https://www.okv.fi/media/filer_public/10/a7/10a7b1fe-03a9-418e-b11c-55aaf 
0e152b8/okv_2019_1_2017.pdf).  
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C. Law as Design and Legitimacy of Architecture? 
Following these framings, we come to understand technological design in broad 
terms as the political choices related to fabricated architectures that affect human behavior 
in different ways. From this perspective, law as a fabricated social structure can be seen as 
the product as well as the means of design, echoing legal philosopher Roscoe Pound’s 
notion of law as a powerful technology for social engineering.21 The overlap between legal 
and technological structures is apparent. Law as we know it is a product of design, although 
often implicitly. When our understanding of technology detaches from purely technological 
artifacts, we are able to conceptualize legal structures as technologies. Also, law embeds 
values and is designed to produce mechanisms for formulating and building these values 
into legal concepts, principles, doctrines, and mechanisms.  
Within law, this architectural similarity has not gone unnoticed. For example, 
Lawrence Lessig’s famous formulation of code as law highlights how technical 
infrastructures have become central tools for regulating behavior in digital networked 
environments like the internet. The software code operates alongside more traditional 
normative frameworks such as legal regulation, markets, and social norms.22 Lessig’s 
argument has been criticized as a form of cyber-paternalism, as it reflects concern for the 
covert and insidious control mechanisms inherent in software code that can be remedied 
by legislation and transparency of regulation.23 According to Ronald Leenes, Lessig’s 
approach emphasizes the growing importance of “design-based control mechanisms [that] 
are extremely powerful because they act ex ante rather than ex post” and thus do not include 
sanctions or punishments in the traditional legal meaning.24 But the legitimacy gap of 
technological design follows from the structural similarities tempered by differing operating 
logic. Simply put, if code is in fact law, production of code becomes legislative drafting, 
albeit without the political constraints definitive to legislative processes.  
In turn, STS scholar Mireille Hildebrandt discusses the similarities and differences 
between the normativity of legal rules and the normative consequences of technological 
architectures. She defines technological normativity as “the way a particular technological 
device or infrastructure actually constrains human actions, inviting or enforcing, inhibiting 
or prohibiting types of behavior.”25 Similarly to Lessig, Hildebrandt draws attention to the 
lack of democratic legitimacy regulation by technological architecture as it is not produced 
through democratic legislative procedure or reliant on the state’s authority. However, the 
 
21 Roscoe Pound, Social Control Through Law (1942); cf. Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural 
Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 973 (2005). 
22 Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (2006). 
23 Andrew D. Murray, Internet Regulation, in Handbook on the Politics of Regulation 274 (David Levi-Faur 
ed., 2011). 
24 Ronald Leenes, Framing Techno-Regulation: An Exploration of State and Non-State Regulation by 
Technology, 5 Legisprudence 143, 147 (2011). 
25 Mireille Hildebrandt, Legal and Technological Normativity: More (and Less) Than Twin Sisters, 12 Techné: 
Research Phil. & Tech. 169, 176 (2008). 
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impact technological design has on behavior is ultimately defined context-dependently, 
much in the same way as how law operates on a case-by-case basis: “[T]here is never just 
one way for a technology to take its place in the socio-technical tissue of the collective.”26  
These structural similarities further emphasize how technological design is about 
social interaction. Although the difference between legal and technological structures seems 
inescapable, ultimately they become entwined. Julie Cohen draws attention to the dynamic 
reciprocity of law and technology, whereby law takes part in shaping the dynamics of 
technological change and is continuously restructured by it.27 Legal historian Cornelia 
Vismann demonstrated how administrative and legal processes have always been developed 
around a range of media forms, including paper documents, files, and classification 
structures that shape the processes around them.28 Simply put, decision-making routines 
and technological developments have an intertwined history.29 This is to say that legal 
processes formed around and within traditional media forms have incorporated value-laden 
choices that create hegemonic structures of privilege and marginalization. Architectures, 
physical or abstract, create subjectivity and agency, simultaneously subjugating people to 
established configurations of power and control and enabling only desirable forms of 
participation and action. Hence technological design is not simply about implementation of 
legal rules in algorithmic structures but is also a question of democratic legitimacy, related 
to the context-dependency of design choices.30 
How can we employ design methods in the legal and technological architectures to 
improve inclusion and participation? As Winner argues, the crucial time for value-sensitive 
design choices is at the introduction of new technologies, such as when the decision is made 
on development and deployment. After these initial commitments, the choices become set 
in stone and the original flexibility of design is lost, much in the same way as long-lasting 
legislation.31 These insights suggest that values should be defined, elaborated, and translated 
at the beginning of the design process, taking into consideration the context-dependent 
variables. This context-dependency of value-sensitive design seems inevitable, posing a 
challenge for both legal and engineering rationalities, which value preset and consistent 
generalized rules that entail easy and predictable implementation and operationalization 
regardless of context.  
Finally, the context-dependency of design circles back to agency. Technological 
design choices tend to privilege certain types of citizens over others, depending on their 
 
26 Id. 
27 Julie Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism (2019).  
28 Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology (Geoffrey Winthrop-Young trans., 2008); see also 
Lisa Gitelman, Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents (2014). 
29 John M. Carroll et al., The Task-Artifact Cycle, in Designing Interaction 74 (John M. Carroll ed., 1991).  
30 Mireille Hildebrandt, Legal Protection by Design: Objections and Refutations, 5 Legisprudence 223, 242 
(2011) (“it is important to create democratic accountability concerning design decisions that will effectively 
rule the polity”). 
31 Winner, supra note 7, at 128. 
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capabilities and agency.32 Depending on context-specific design rationalities, technology 
implementation may be coercive or enabling to its users, as design choices and 
implementation methods influence the work-arounds users develop against systems with 
low usability.33 Hence the question of “how do we ensure technological design embeds legal 
values such as justice, equality, and due process?” cannot be separated from the practice-
oriented questions of “who are the end-users and whose agency are we privileging by given 
design choices?”  
In terms of law regulating design, these questions may be addressed through a range 
of legal frameworks and mechanisms. For example, end-user perspectives are included in 
the processes of public procurement of information systems,34 although their legal relevance 
is not limited to these processes. In addition, the aim of the regulatory frameworks on 
privacy and data protection is to regulate algorithmic systems. This is seen in the EU’s 
inclusion in the GDPR of provisions on data protection principles that should be 
implemented in technological design. In the next section I examine these provisions in 
further detail to find out what is meant by implementing transparency as a guiding principle 
in the design of data processing activities.  
III. Demarcating Transparency by Design in the GDPR Framework 
A. Transparency by Design in the GDPR 
At first glance, implementing transparency straight into design seems like a perfect solution, 
if not to all negative consequences of algorithmization, then at least to the notorious black 
box problem.35 The black box dilemma can be defined as the combination of regulatory 
and technological structures that obscure the inner workings of an algorithmic system; this 
may consist of a combination of proprietary rights related to source code or chosen 
software engineering techniques that prevent deciphering the exact relationship between 
system input and output. Yet the concern for technological obscurity is by no means recent 
and the critique against the transparency panacea precedes the current algorithm debate.36  
 
32 Lucia Liste & Knut H. Sørensen, Consumer, Client or Citizen? How Norwegian Local Governments 
Domesticate Website Technology and Configure Their Users, 18 Info., Comm. & Soc’y 733 (2015). 
33 Paul Simon Adler & Bryan Borys, Two Types of Bureaucracy: Enabling and Coercive, 41 Admin. Sci. Q. 
61 (1996). 
34 Seungho Park-Lee, Contexts of Briefing for Service Design Procurements in the Finnish Public Sector, 69 
Design Stud. 1 (2020). 
35 See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and 
Information (2015).  
36 E.g., Langdon Winner, Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social Constructivism and the 
Philosophy of Technology, 18 Sci., Tech., & Hum. Values 362 (1993). These limitations of transparency have 
also been acknowledged in current AI policy and regulation that emphasize explainability and 
understandability as related concepts. For an overview of AI ethics debate, see, e.g., Hagendorff, supra note 
6. 
Koulu — Transparency by Design 91 
 
Since 2018, the GPDR has provided a central legal framework to address issues 
related to data-driven algorithmization in the EU. Although the GDPR is not the only legal 
basis within the EU regulating algorithmic transparency, it does form a reference point for 
regulation and policy.37 Hence, the ways in which transparency by design is conceptualized 
in the GDPR helps us to map out what is the intended object of transparency.  
The GDPR gives form to two sides of the concept of transparency by design. First, 
it elaborates the importance and content of transparency as the guiding principle of all data 
processing. Article 12 on the rights of the data subject conveys transparency obligations in 
the information given to the data subject regarding the data’s processing, requiring that such 
information needs to be “concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using 
clear and plain language.” Before being replaced by the European Data Protection Board, 
the independent advisory body Article 29 Working Party (WP29) produced guidelines on 
interpretation of transparency requirements. The WP29 guidelines state that transparency 
should be understood as user-centric and connected with understandability of data 
processing, which is the prerequisite for ability to contest. The guidelines also construe 
transparency as an expression of fairness.38  
To summarize, transparency is about the data subject’s right to be informed about 
data processing activities in clear and plain language. Here the circular logic of transparency 
within the data protection framework becomes apparent; the principle of transparency is 
the objective, which is achieved by transparent information as the means. As Ida Koivisto 
argues, transparency has become an all-encompassing principle which starts to lose its 
significance through its over-extensive definition. Transparency is transformed into a 
performative medium, the object of which is to ensure transparency, but not to grant access 
to the authentic content behind the performance.39 
Second, Article 25 on “data protection by design and by default” connects data 
protection principles with the design of processing activities. The Article creates a concrete 
obligation for data controllers to implement appropriate technical and organizational 
measures, including transparency, into the design of data processing activities to ensure the 
protection of the rights of data subjects. WP29 guidelines support the effective 
implementation of data protection by design, including a checklist on how to implement 
data protection principles.40 According to the guidelines, transparency by design and by 
default is about information design, i.e. how to fulfil the information obligation in clear, 
 
37 It should be noted that algorithmic transparency may serve several functions in addition to guiding 
designers. For example, transparency is connected with another focal issue of AI regulation of liability, where 
the principle facilitates the identification of harm and the person responsible. See, e.g., Madeleine Clare Elish, 
Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction, 5 Engaging Sci., Tech., & Soc’y 40 
(2019). 
38 WP29 Guidelines on transparency adopted in 2017 and as last revised and adopted in April 2018, § 4. 
39 Ida Koivisto, Thinking Inside the Box: The Promise and Boundaries of Transparency in Automated 
Decision-Making, 1 Acad. Eur. L. Working Papers 1 (2020). 
40 WP29 Guidelines 4/2019 on the Interpretation of Article 25. 
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contextual and comprehensible terms. In addition, the organizational and technological 
compliance measures may include the introduction of key performance indicators to 
demonstrate compliance. Interestingly, the data protection framework does not 
differentiate between organizational and technological means, implying that these are 
entwined.  
The guidelines clarify the temporal dimension of implementing transparency is at 
the time of determination of the means for data processing and at the time of processing 
itself. According to the Guidelines, “means for data processing” should be interpreted to 
range “from the abstract to the concrete detailed design elements of the processing, such 
as architecture, procedures, protocols, layout and appearance.”41 This interpretation reveals 
how the object of transparency lies within the architecture of algorithmic systems and how 
transparency should be understood in relation to the design processes that give shape to 
automation, including the datafication and proceduralization required for automated data 
processing. Furthermore, the Guidelines acknowledge the importance of default settings in 
system design since without them, the data subject “would be overwhelmed by options that 
he or she may not have the ability to grasp.”42  
Despite the prima facie technological neutrality of the GDPR, the interpretation of 
data protection by design and by default reveal how the object of regulation is ultimately 
algorithmic systems, the automated data processing activities that define computerized 
organizational processes.43 Here, the logic of transparency to render its object visible and 
tangible is at play. The black boxes of technological artifacts are opened by the transparency 
obligations of informing data subjects early on in designing data processing activities. Yet 
the object of transparency remains elusive and immaterial: the provisions come down to 
the organization’s responsibility to assess necessary measures and procedural safeguards 
and to decide how to present information to the data subject. Ultimately, this translates into 
demonstratable compliance, performativity which takes the form of quantifiable key 
performance indicators.  
B. Transparency of What? 
What, then, is made transparent by design? Janssen et al. argue that transparency is 
linked with the promise of opening up government through transparent datasets. They 
perceive transparency by design as referring to both the design processes and the outcomes 
 
41 Id. § 33. 
42 Id. § 40. 
43 E.g., Dag Wiese Schartum, Making Privacy by Design Operative, 24 Int’l J.L. & Info. Tech. 151, 159 (2016):  
Technically speaking, however, it is the “processing” of personal data which is subject to 
regulation, not the “information systems” performing this processing. Although there is no 
1:1 relationship between “processing” and “information system,” it would be feasible to 
structure and formulate rules of the Directive and the draft General Data Protection 
Regulation using the term “personal data system” (or equivalent) as a fundamental concept, 
instead of “processing” of personal data. 
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of these processes, “the systems and processes for ensuring transparency.”44 Yet 
transparency by design remains difficult to achieve due to the complex ecosystems in which 
data and applications are interwoven, challenges which are fundamentally linked with the 
context-dependency of technology development.  
Such transparency of datasets does not grant access to the inner workings of 
computers for the reasons discussed in earlier research. The growing literature on 
explainability and understandability of AI has sought to elaborate different techniques for 
knowing what goes on inside the computer, or alternatively, giving grounds for the 
automatically produced output. These techniques, which include counter-factual reasoning 
and source code publicity, demonstrate the shortcomings of transparency: the object of 
explanation shifts and is no more attainable than the inner workings of the human decision-
maker, whom we have come to fear and trust.45 Simply put, inside the computer, one finds 
wires and circuits. Inside the human, one finds veins and brain tissue. Neither one of these 
physical tangible objects reflects the abstract intangible architectures that constitute 
decision-making processes. Understandably, it has not gone unnoticed that transparency 
obligations may create double standards by which stricter expectations are imposed on 
algorithmic systems than are imposed human-driven decision-making processes.46  
These arguments are not unique to legal decision-making or to data protection and 
AI regulation. As Winner argued in his critique of the social constructivist approach to 
technology, the very purpose of black boxes in software engineering is to describe a 
complex system that performs a certain function without the need to go inside the system 
itself. According to Winner, the focus on opening the black box hides the effects of 
technological artifacts on people’s behavior, the effects being described as “the social 
consequences of technical choice.”47 Furthermore, Winner believes that focusing on 
opening the artifacts and understanding them sidelines attention from what is included and 
excluded from the agenda of technological design. In addition to voices heard, the non-
decisions and silences—that which is left outside intentionally or inadvertently—shape 
technology’s social consequences of technology. The design incorporates assumptions 
about the perceived users whose needs guide the choices and priorities implemented into 
system architecture.48  
It follows from the regulatory framing that much of the socio-legal discussion on 
“by design” occurs within data protection. Hence, legal scholars have focused on 
 
44 Marijn Janssen et al., Transparency-By-Design as a Foundation for Open Government, 11 Transforming 
Gov’t: People, Process & Pol’y 2 (2017). 
45 Riikka Koulu, Proceduralising Control and Discretion: Human Oversight in Artificial Intelligence Policy, 
27 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 720 (2020). 
46 See also John Zerilli et al., Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making: Is There a Double 
Standard?, 32 Phil. & Tech. 661 (2019). 
47 Langdon Winner, Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social Constructivism and the 
Philosophy of Technology, 18 Sci., Tech. & Hum. Values 362, 368 (1993). 
48 People perceive technology different ways, cf. Bucher, supra note 10.  
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elaborating different design-based means to operationalize legal values directly related to 
privacy. For example, Hartzog and Stutzman argue that privacy by design should be about 
prioritizing obscurity, with a range of implementation techniques from access walls and 
search blockers to de-identification tools.49 In his examination of privacy by design, Dag 
Wiese Schartum argues that the concept is too vague and open-ended, which imposes 
challenges for operationalizing the values. Schartum states that “such a broad definition of 
the object of design makes it difficult to establish a common and sufficiently concrete 
design methodology.”50 He proceeds to elaborate four design elements that would help 
bridge the gap between law and technology and thus facilitate operationalization: 
architecture design, data design, process design and interface design.51  
This leads us to the following. We can frame the policy problem related to 
algorithmic governance as that of the design processes which define what values and 
ideologies will be reflected in technological architectures and subsequently give rise to social 
consequences. Formulated in this way, algorithmic design is not simply about giving people 
legal measures to ensure their personal data is processed automatically in a way they would 
like but rather about the underlying design choices done within organizations that 
implement data-intensive algorithmic systems. Yet the transparency requirements in the 
GDPR do not seem to extend to the design processes of algorithmic systems, as the object 
of regulation is defined in terms of data and data processing. It seems that the GDPR and 
the interpretative WP29 Guidelines do not account for the value-sensitive and inherently 
political nature of design, in which context-specific design choices ultimately shape the 
social consequences of algorithmic systems. In other words, transparency by design de-
politicizes the inescapable value-sensitivity of technological design. In other words, 
transparency of design is not at the core of transparency by design in the data protection 
framework.  
But can we make design processes transparent? This would require a shift: from 
transparency of data processing to transparency of the design processes themselves. This 
shift would enable us to address the political dimensions of technological design and, by 
making the value-laden nature of technology explicit, open up new questions. For example, 
the political dimension of technological design draws attention to participation and 
inclusion. When we start discussing the transparency of design, the question of who is to be 
granted access to these processes and whose perspectives will be included in the 
compromises and conflicts that define design choices becomes vital. Transparency of 
design processes does not guarantee the necessary context-dependency of value 
prioritization, but it does bring the political dimension and legitimacy gap of design back 
into focus.  
 
49 Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 385 (2013). 
50 Schartum, supra note 43, at 153. 
51 Id. at 163. 
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IV. Do Not Worry, There Is a Process: 
Prioritizing Access of Transparency 
Value-sensitive design requires definition and prioritization of principles that should 
function as design constraints and objectives. Transparency alone is too limited for 
addressing the negative consequences of algorithmization. Transparency’s circular and 
performative logic is related to making the abstract tangible, and so its promise within 
technological design is implicitly connected with the technological artifact: the algorithmic 
system. In this way, transparency also depoliticizes technological design and reduces the 
political value-sensitive decisions into ensuring transparency as both means and the 
objective. Hence, transparency by design materializes algorithmic systems and disguises the 
context-dependency of design choices that ultimately define the social consequences of 
algorithmization.  
An alternative framing that could be adopted alongside or instead of transparency 
can be found in the procedural language of access to justice, which brings the user 
perspective back into the debate. The rhetoric of access to design processes can be 
understood as a way to reintroduce politics and the importance of participation for 
legitimacy creation into technological design.  
The discursive shift to access reflects the growing importance of procedural 
safeguards and mechanisms discussed in socio-legal scholarship. Mireille Hildebrandt and 
Katja de Vries emphasize the growing importance of due process and the right to 
contestation in the face of the computational turn.52 This line of argumentation has also 
been elaborated in the GDPR, which stipulates procedural safeguards on data subjects’ 
ability to contest processing of their data, an approach which has also stimulated discussions 
on how to implement contestability to technological design.53  
In the context of legal decision-making, values embedded in technological design 
become even more decisive for legitimacy.54 The lawyer’s straightforward answer to bad 
design is that algorithmic systems should comply with the existing law. However, it often 
remains unclear how this should be achieved within design processes, in which the context-
dependency of design choices limits the feasibility of generalized rules. The fragmentation 
of regulatory frameworks is at least partly to blame for the lack of regulatory focus on design 
processes. For example, legal regimes frame design-related issues in terms of data 
protection, liability, competition and fundamental rights. In the public domain, regulation 
of public procurement also shapes the dynamics of technological design processes by 
implementing a harmonized procedure for public contracts.  
 
52 Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: The Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy of 
Technology (Mireille Hildebrandt & Katja de Vries eds., 2013).  
53 See also Marco Almeda, Human Intervention in Automated Decision Making: Toward the Construction of 
Contestable Systems, ICAIL ’19: Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 2 (2019). 
54 Niklas Luhmann, Recht und Automation in der öffentlichen Verwaltung (1966); Lawrence Lessig, Code 
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Another reason for the inability to capture design within law can be found in the 
combination of technological neutrality and the implicit medium of human agency in law.55 
Together, these two sides have maintained the status quo whereby legal decision-making is 
increasingly performed within information systems and legal institutions rely on the 
deployment of computers, yet this development is disguised from view. Following the 
famous catchphrase, computerization works in the shadow of the law, where deployment 
has taken place without much change in legislation or in our conceptualization of decision-
making processes. Despite early scholarship acknowledging the constitutional and political 
dimensions of information systems, on the ground level of legal practice, computer 
deployment has mostly been perceived as trivial minutiae of improved secretarial work.  
Contrastingly, research in the social sciences has elaborated the on-going 
technological change through hybridization in complex socio-technical systems,56 through 
which social practices become defined by human behavior within, around and in 
collaboration with technological artifacts and processes. However, it is important to also 
note that the focus on design processes can be used to disguise human agency, when the 
existence of a process pipeline itself is perceived to produce legitimacy, to grant us the 
appearance of participation without actually ensuring it in any true sense. In other words, 
processes should also be understood as technologies of justification.57 Here is also the allure 
of proceduralization. Because such procedural perspectives have these inherent qualities, 
conceptualizations of design processes need to focus on the human actors in addition to 
procedural structures.  
Another fundamental quality of such a procedural perspective on algorithmization 
is that everything can be construed as a process. This can be interpreted both as a limitation 
of its explanatory power and an advantage for translation from law to software engineering. 
We can differentiate between the legal processes such as adjudication and legislation from 
the automated data processing that constitutes the algorithmization of these traditional legal 
processes. Furthermore, the design processes that constitute the production of 
algorithmization need to be differentiated from the processes of using, assessing, and 
monitoring algorithmic systems–and the procedural design of these processes that follow 
deployment. In addition, the legitimacy gap of current technological design can also be 
articulated in relation to political processes that give form and legitimacy to law, as discussed 
 
55 Koulu, supra note 45. 
56 Typically attributed to Eric Trist et al. in the 1960s in the context of coal mines to refer to the interaction 
between people and technology at workplaces, based on the paper “The Relations of Social and Technical 
Systems in Coal Mining,” presented at the British Psychological Society in 1950. See Eric Trist, The Evolution 
of Socio Technical Systems (1981) (https://www.lmmiller.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/The-
Evolution-of-Socio-Technical-Systems-Trist.pdf). In Trist’s definition, technical aspects refer to 
organizational structure and processes, not necessarily to material technology. Currently, STS/ANT scholars 
making similar observations locate the starting point as Magoroh Maruyama, The Second Cybernetics: 
Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Processes, 5 Am. Scientist 164 (1963). 
57 See also Jenni Hakkarainen, Naming Something Collective Does Not Make It One: Algorithmic 
Discrimination and Access to Justice, 10 Internet Pol’y Rev. (forthcoming). 
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earlier in relation to Hildebrandt’s research. Ultimately, the legal system itself can be 
construed in terms of on-going proceduralization of legal protection through establishment 
of mechanisms for its realization. Thus, the procedural perspective is in danger of becoming 
an all-encompassing reductio ad absurdum. 
Despite its limitations, the procedural perspective can provide alternative 
formulations that help us to conceptualize the legitimacy gap related to technological 
design. Simply put, technological design can and should be understood as an issue of access 
to justice—both access to value-laden design processes and access as a design value. This 
approach places emphasis on the similarities between discussions about algorithmization 
and older debates on procedural thresholds, which prevent those in need of legal protection 
from seeking it. In other words, the procedural perspective can be used to introduce the 
concept of access to justice to technological design, both at the level of access to design 
processes and as a value to be prioritized within these processes.  
The visual design of technological interfaces, the preferred default settings and 
architectural choices that aim to nudge behavior are new formulations of the age-old 
question of interaction with and within the legal system. This connection has been observed 
by Ayelet Sela, whose examination of “digital choice architectures” makes the connection 
between access to justice and technological design explicit. She builds her examination on 
observations made in user experience and human-computer interaction research that 
demonstrate how people make decisions differently in digital environments and through 
mobile phones—often faster and with less deliberation than in analog encounters. The 
placement of icons on the screen or the order of options in drop-down menus can influence 
the choices people make, which is a viewpoint that should be taken into consideration when 
designing technological interfaces for the legal domain.58 Building on Selat’s observations, 
the regulatory challenge of algorithmization then becomes not so much an issue of 
transparency of data but instead an issue of access to law, begging the question of which 
types of obstacles algorithmic systems impose on such access. What, then, is the 
relationship and difference between transparency and access? If we prioritize transparency 
over access, do we inadvertently impose more responsibility on those seeking access? Isn’t 
it the law’s obligation to provide access and not only transparency?  
Unlike transparency, access can be directly linked with usability. This additional 
perspective of technological design grants us new ways of operationalizing legal protection 
within abstract architectures: prioritizing access and usability. The rhetoric of access to 
justice is also relatively easy to conceptualize within the research field of human-computer 
interaction (HCI), which focuses on interfaces between computers and their users. The 
legally-oriented concept of access and the HCI-focused concept of usability together 
provide guidance for value-sensitive design of algorithmic legal decision-making. Here, 
accessibility and usability become a focal mechanism to explain the implicit assumptions 
about perceived users and bring out the value-laden nature of design choices that optimize 
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certain user groups. In other words, legal conceptualizations can support taking usability 
seriously in technological design.  
Concretely, the development of socio-legally informed usability indicators is a key 
tool for incorporating access to justice into technological design. Thus, measurable usability 
becomes a prerequisite for digitalization of legal decision-making. This point of departure 
also derives institutional support from the EU’s Web Accessibility Directive (2016/2102) 
which has been applied to public sector websites since September 2020. The Directive 
requires public sector bodies to follow specific technical standards and procedural 
safeguards to ensure accessibility for persons with disabilities. Such legal instruments have 
the advantage of translating access issues into key performance indicators for usability 
testing, which have practical relevance for context-specific design.  
Notably, the GDPR provides tools for addressing design processes through the 
obligation to perform data protection impact assessments to assess the risks of data 
processing activities. Also, the establishment of key performance indicators within the data 
protection framework can facilitate a shift of focus to usability. However, problems related 
to quantification reveal the value-laden nature of deciding on relevant indicators. In the 
end, indicators of abstract things such as access to justice can be criticized as an attempt to 
measure that which is not measurable. But the practice-oriented reader would counter this 
critique by pointing out that even insufficient indicators are better than nothing. To say the 
least, measurable indicators can be used to initiate the debate on who are the ultimate users 
and whose perspectives are prioritized in design processes, thus making the implicit 
assumptions explicit.  
Yet even good design does not guarantee safety. There are fundamental limitations 
in the notion of controlling algorithmization through proceduralized control. Even the right 
design choices are limited in their ability to remove risks associated with hybridization in 
complex socio-technological systems. For example, sociologist John Perrow discusses 
human error when accidents happen in complex technical systems and argues that the 
combined effects of tightly coupled complex systems and a high-risk potential render 
accidents unavoidable by simple design choices.59 Hence, access to legal redress remains of 
uttermost importance.  
Finally, we face an issue of democratic legitimacy of technological architectures. 
Although we should problematize the social practices of technological design, this framing 
is limited in its ability to conceptualize the sources for negative consequences of 
algorithmization. Transparency of design processes has the potential to make explicit the 
human-driven design choices that have a bearing on legal protection, yet there is the 
inherent risk of proceduralization, through which the establishment of process as regulatory 
control mechanism constitutes rubber-stamping legitimacy. On one hand, multi-
stakeholder models can also be used to legitimize without any true interest to incorporate 
insights into design. On the other hand, we know that collective epistemic processes lead 
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to better outcomes in creative problem solving, which is also what technological design 
fundamentally is.60 
V. Conclusion 
The notion that law should take technological design more seriously and vice versa is not 
new. Law can constrain and support societally sustainable technological design. This 
requires the development of a socio-legal perspective on technological design that goes 
beyond the current interpretation of the EU’s data protection framework, in which “by 
design” is still connected with the data processing activities automated through algorithmic 
systems, and not the design processes themselves. Without being informed by law, 
designers make value-sensitive decisions that put law in action with a limited understanding 
of what legal values should be implemented in technological architectures. In any case, law 
is left to deal with the fallout from ill-designed technology.   
Ultimately, we come back to the architectural metaphor underlying transparency by 
design. “By design” approaches entail a promise of easy translation between legal and 
technological architectures. The metaphor of architecture is repeated in the concept of 
transparency: the window, the see-through veil. The promise of transparency renders its 
object tangible, understandable and hence less fearsome. Transparency by design promises 
a safe physical environment, a regulated space that comes without unwanted consequences. 
Simultaneously, transparency by design remains the prisoner of its metaphorical 
foundation, connected with the technological artifact that it hopes to render material and 
controllable. However, a shift away from transparency enables us to focus on the social 
processes around technology design and the humans involved in the processes.  
Transparency of design is not an end in itself, nor the means to an end, but it is a 
start. Transparency does not replace access. Instead of understanding transparency by 
design in relation to data or algorithmic systems, transparency of design enables us to 
broaden the debate on sufficient policy action on algorithmization of legal decision-making. 
Through understanding technology and design as also inherent in legal structures, we can 
capture the importance of value-laden design processes for legal protection. Here, public 
organizations and legal processes are seen as technologies, as the result of design processes, 
through which priorities are negotiated and compromises reached, and we perceive how 
legal tools, conceptualizations and frameworks can address these practices. Understood in 
this way, access to design processes becomes a tool for fixing the legitimacy gap related to 
technological design of algorithmic systems. Furthermore, access as a design constraint 
would help mitigate the marginalizing effects of technological design that follow from 
limited understanding of usability.  
Finally, access over (technological) threshold goes beyond transparency’s promise. 
Such a discursive shift towards access over thresholds provides an alternative architectural 
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metaphor; it implies going further, getting to the inside. Within law, such use of language is 
not novel, but in the context of technological design, the exchange of metaphors 
reintroduces the perspectives of access to justice research to debates about 
algorithmization. This approach facilitates a discursive shift in the architectural language 
from looking in to overcoming obstacles in the way of access. Instead of observers trying 
to see technological artifacts, the focus on usability and accessibility in design processes 
enables us to explicitly ask how to get in.  
